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Th e Stoics on Identity
George Djukic
A useful corrective to the increasingly ahistorical approach in much contemporary 
philosophy is an appreciation of the fact, oft en neglected these days, that many of 
the themes currently at the centre-stage of philosophical discussion were not mere-
ly raised by the Greeks but dealt with along lines that ring familiar to modern ears. 
A case in point is the issue of individuation in contemporary analytic metaphysics, 
in particular as it arises in connection with the problem of change. It will emerge 
that various moves in the recent literature have affi  nities with and indeed were an-
ticipated by the Stoics in their treatment of puzzles of mereological change.
A useful corrective to the increasingly ahistorical approach in much contempo-
rary philosophy is an appreciation of the fact, oft en neglected these days, that 
many of the themes currently at the centre-stage of philosophical discussion 
were not merely raised by the Greeks but dealt with along lines that ring familiar 
to modern ears. A case in point is the issue of individuation in contemporary 
analytic metaphysics, in particular as it arises in connection with the problem of 
change.
Th e physical world is marked by constant change. Commonsense takes it that 
objects can survive some changes but not others. So for example, a tree is thought 
to be capable of surviving the loss of a leaf, but not of being chopped down for 
fi rewood. Th at is, the world is relatively stable even though variable. For Hera-
clitus by contrast, the fact of change meant that the physical world was radically 
unstable. For he did not share the commonsense view that an object could survive 
change. Impressed by this, Plato accorded the physical world a spurious kind of 
existence, locating reality outside the changing fl ux of space-time in the world of 
the immutable Forms. By contrast, the Stoics shared the commonsense opinion 
that objects can endure through change. Indeed, their criterion of existence was 
the capacity of something to produce or experience some change, which of course 
presupposes that one and the same object endures through that change. And as 
materialists, they considered this criterion to be satisfi ed only by three-dimen-
sional material bodies (See A. A. Long 1986:153).
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It is well-known that the Academic sceptics engaged in constant critical dia-
lectic with the Stoics. Under Carneades, the Academics formulated an argument 
that in eff ect directly challenged both the Stoic criterion of existence and the 
tenability of the notion of endurance through change. Th e Growing Argument, 
(Auxanomenos Logos), as it came to be called, was reported by Plutarch (Comm. 
not. 1083 B-C) as follows:
(a) All individual substances are in fl ux and motion, releasing some things from them-
selves and receiving others which reach them from elsewhere.
(b) Th e numbers or quantities which these are added to, or subtracted from, do not 
remain the same but become diff erent as the aforementioned arrivals and departures 
cause the substance to be transformed.
Chrysippos (c. 280–c. 207 BC).
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(c) Th e prevailing convention is wrong to call these processes of growth and decay: 
rather they should be called generation and destruction, since they transform the thing 
from what it is into something else, whereas growing and diminishing are attributes of 
a body which serves as substrate and remains. 
       (Sedley, 1982:256)
Clearly, if we add an extra F to a pile containing n Fs, we do not say that the number 
n has grown; rather, we say that it has been replaced. By parity of reasoning, the 
sceptics urged, we should say that a material object that has gained or lost a part 
should be said not to have grown or diminished, but to have ceased to exist, re-
placed by a numerically distinct object. As Sedley rightly points out, the question 
is whether material objects and numbers do behave alike in respect of individua-
tion (Sedley, 1982:257). If material objects are indeed individuated by their com-
ponents, that is, if they can be regarded as fusions of their parts, then any change 
in components constitutes a change of identity. Hume certainly thought this to 
be the case (Hume, 1978, 1.4.6). More recently, Roderick Chisholm (Chisholm, 
1976), David Lewis (Lewis, 1986) and David Armstrong (Armstrong, 1980) have 
joined him. Chisholm’s response is to ascribe a conventionalist fi ctionality to 
three-dimensional continuants, whereas Lewis’ and Armstrong’s own realist re-
sponse it to make objects four-dimensional fusions of temporal parts. (Th e Stoics, 
it will be recalled, considered objects to be three-dimensional: they had spatial 
parts, but not temporal parts; the idea of temporal parts was alien to their way 
of thinking.)
Th e Academic principle of individuation amounts to the claim that sameness 
of parts (material composition) is both suffi  cient and necessary for sameness of 
identity. If the Academics are right, then since fusions are individuated by their 
parts, it would seem that given the fact of change, material objects cannot be three-
dimensional fusions. Th is holds true whether these parts are themselves physical 
objects, or properties, in the manner of bundle theories. Now among contempo-
rary metaphysicians we fi nd the increasingly popular view of material objects as 
three-dimensional fusions whose logic is governed by systems of mereological 
logic. In response to the Growing Argument, these philosophers adopt a tempo-
rally relative parthood relation. Th at is, they reject the implicit presupposition of 
the Growing Argument that object x existing at t1 and object y existing at t2 are 
identical just where x’s parts at t1 are the same as y’s parts at t2. Instead, on a tem-
poral relativisation of the parthood relation, three-dimensional x is identical with 
three-dimensional y just where for all times t, they have the same parts at t.1
Notwithstanding the temporal relativisation of the parthood relation, there 
is a problem that the three-dimensionalist fusion theorist faces. It arises in the 
1 One reservation about this approach is that its ontology seems to involve substrata.
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context of David Wiggins’ thought experiment concerning Tibbles the cat (Wig-
gins, 1968). Consider a cat called “Tibbles”, and imagine that portion of her which 
includes everything but her tail. Call that portion “Tibs”. Clearly, Tibbles and 
Tibs do not have all their properties in common at that one time. For one thing, 
their spatial boundaries do not coincide. So, by the indiscernibility of identicals, 
they are non-identical. (Th e indiscernibility principle relevant here reads: If x=y 
then for all t, x is F at t if and only if y is F at t.) Now suppose that Tibbles’ tail 
is removed. Tibbles and Tibs now coincide spatially aft er the caudal ablation. 
Intuitively, Tibbles endures, and does so as a cat. It would seem that Tibs has 
also endured, and is now a cat. But they are numerically distinct cats, in virtue 
of having diff erent histories. (For one thing, Tibbles underwent a caudal ablation, 
but Tibs never had such a part.) In short, we have two cats in the same place at the 
same time. Indeed, the argument can be rerun with a slight modifi cation to show 
that we have thousands of cats coinciding exactly. (Take all of Tibs except for one 
hair on her tail. Take all of Tibs except for another hair on her tail. etc.) Th is seems 
just wrong. 
On a four-dimensionalist picture, there is no such problem. What we have is a 
situation where four-dimensionalist Tibs shares a temporal part with four-dimen-
sionalist Tibbles. In short, the problem is one for the three-dimensionalist, and 
arises independently of the temporal relativisation of the parthood relation. 
Wiggins is of course a three-dimensionalist. Th e moral he draws is that we 
should simply learn to live with coincidence. Now Wiggins took the Tibs-Tibbles 
example from Peter Geach, who himself took it from William of Sherwood. Ulti-
mately, it originated with the Stoics under Chrysippos. Chrysippos’ original puzzle 
involves a man rather than a cat, but is otherwise exactly the same puzzle. Take 
a man, Dion. Let “Th eon” name that portion of him which includes everything 
except his left  foot. Th at is, Dion corresponds to Tibbles, Th eon to Tibs, and the 
foot to Tibbles’ tail. If we then cut off  the foot, we get numerically distinct objects, 
Dion and Th eon, composed of exactly the same matter at the same time. And 
intuitively, this seems absurd.
Now this seems to hoist the Stoics with a petard of their own making. Yet, 
according to Sedley, Chrysippos uses the Dion-Th eon example to stand the Grow-
ing Argument on its head (Sedley, 1982:270). For according to Chrysippos, it is 
the Academic principle of individuation that has landed us with the coincidence 
problem. Th e principle, we recall, amounts to the claim that sameness of material 
composition is both suffi  cient and necessary for sameness of identity. Th is prob-
lem can be avoided by rejecting the principle in both respects. Firstly, if it is to be 
Dion who survives then sameness of material composition cannot be necessary 
for sameness of identity. Secondly, to avoid coincidence of distinct entities, one of 
them will have to disappear. To save the three-dimensionalist notion of a continu-
ant, this requires that Th eon perish once the foot is amputated. Th at is, sameness 
of material composition cannot be suffi  cient for identity.
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According to Chrysippos, as reported by Philo of Alexandria, it is Th eon that 
perishes (Sedley, 1982:268). But what, independently of his motivation to salvage 
the notion of a continuant, entitles Chrysippos to this claim? Without regard to 
this motivation, isn’t it just as reasonable, if not more so, to insist that Dion per-
ishes, and that Th eon alone survives? Th e Academic sceptics would certainly say 
that this is what really happens. Now, in consigning Th eon to post-amputation 
oblivion, Chrysippos anticipates the move made by Michael Burke in a series of 
papers in the 1990s (See Burke, 1994). Th e main objection to this sort of move is 
that Dion’s loss of a foot is a purely extrinsic change in Th eon, yet is supposed to 
signify his destruction. Th is is counterintuitive.
Furthermore, it is inconsistent with the Stoic’s own views in epistemology. Sed-
ley explains how the Stoics sought to make a case for knowledge on the basis of 
their doctrine of infallible cognition (katalepsis) (Sedley, 1982:263ff .). According to 
this doctrine, we have perceptual knowledge because some perceptions are such as 
to guarantee their veracity. Th is was coupled with a commitment to the Leibnizian 
notion of the identity of indiscernibles. For the Stoics, this meant in practice, that 
even identical twins will have to carry some empirically accessible feature suffi  cient 
to distinguish them perceptually. Th at is, every material object has a unique per-
ceptual marker, which characterises them for the duration of their existence, and 
indeed is essential to their identity. But this undermines the Burkean move made 
by the Stoics.
For before the amputation, Th eon is a proper part of Dion. Hence, all of Th eon’s 
properties will be a proper subset of Dion’s. Th is means in particular that should 
Th eon have some essence, this essence won’t be unique to him: Dion will have it 
too. So, by the Stoic’s own principles, Th eon does not even qualify as a genuine 
material object. He simply does not exist before the amputation. Th ere can thus be 
no talk of his ceasing to exist aft er the operation. Th at is, rather than falling into 
Burke’s camp, Chrysippos ought by his own views on epistemology to fall into Peter 
van Inwagen’s camp. Van Inwagen is of course the leading exponent of a view that 
denies the existence of arbitrary undetached parts (See Van Inwagen, 1981).
Sedley acknowledges that Chrysippos himself should never have accepted at 
the outset that Dion and Th eon are numerically distinct. In order to rescue Chry-
sippos from inconsistency, he concludes that the paradox of Dion and Th eon is 
not built on Stoic premises at all. Instead, noting that Chrysippos concocted it in a 
work on the Growing Argument, he speculates that it was his dialectical rejoinder 
to the Growing Argument, and that it borrowed its premises from the Academic 
puzzle as a reductio of the Academic thesis that material growth and diminution are 
fatal to any idea of enduring identity. Th at is, by way of counterexample, Chrysip-
pos borrows the Growing Argument’s own presuppositions to concoct an instance 
in which material diminution is actually a condition of enduring identity: it is the 
undiminished Th eon who perishes, while it is the diminished Th eon who survives 
(Sedley, 1982:269–70).
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I fi nd Sedley’s speculation problematic. I consider it more likely that it was the 
Academics who devised the case of Dion and Th eon, rather than the Stoics. Th ey 
devised it to show the absurdity of the notion of endurance through diminution. 
(Th e absurdity being of course that two objects come to occupy exactly the same 
place at a time.) If Chrysippos had devised the puzzle, and if he really had been 
aware that by his own lights, pre-amputation Dion and Th eon could not count as 
numerically distinct individuals, and that it is Dion who perishes with the loss of 
his foot, then the only option available to him would have been to rule that Th eon 
did not exist until the amputation of Dion’s foot. But how then can this ruling 
be squared with Philo of Alexandria’s account of Chrysippos’ position, on which 
Th eon remains with the amputation of Dion’s foot? Now if he remains, then he 
existed at the outset, and continued to exist later on. But if he exists at the outset, 
he is surely distinct from Dion then. Proper parthood does not constitute identity, 
no matter how great the overlap. 
Admittedly, Philo of Alexandria is openly hostile to Chrysippos in the passage 
in question (Sedley, 1982:267). But the hostility is to Chrysippos’ choice of Th eon 
as the survivor, and Sedley accepts Philo’s representation of Chrysippos’ position. 
So I doubt that a case could be made for the claim that Philo simply got it wrong 
when he said that Chrysippos chose Th eon as the survivor. In short, I doubt that 
Chrysippos was aware of the inconsistency of which Sedley is trying to clear him. 
Th at is, in responding to the Academic puzzle of Dion and Th eon, Chrysippos 
conceded the Academic assumption that Th eon existed before the amputation, not 
realising that this confl icted with his own views on individuation as derived from 
Stoic epistemology. Sedley tries to make Chrysippos consistent by making him a 
van Inwagenian, but it seems more likely that he was a Burkean, and inconsist-
ently so.2
In any case, the observation that Chrysippos should have been a van Inwa-
genian and not a Burkean leads to another ad hominem in the Stoic position. 
Th e Stoics, like Aristotle,3 rejected the notion of atoms in the void. For them, the 
physical world was a single unifi ed material continuum, pervaded by the cohesive 
force of pneuma, a composite of fi re and air. Sambursky explains how material 
2 I thus find implausible Sedley’s conjecture that Chrysippos’ solution to the Growing Argument 
provided independent support for Stoic epistemology, in particular, the thesis of infallible recogni-
tion, resting as it did on the thesis that every individual has its own uniquely individuating feature. 
(Sedley, 1982:265–6) For if Chrysippos really was concerned to provide metaphysical support 
through the case of Dion-Theon for his doctrine of infallible recognition, then he hardly would 
have held pre-amputation Dion and Theon to be distinct individuals. Elsewhere, I find interesting 
Sedley’s conjecture that the Stoic doctrine of categories originated at least partly in response to the 
Growing Argument, and that its invocation in effect of relative identity had affinities with Locke’s 
own position (Sedley, 1982:259).
3 But see the paper in this volume by Alan Chalmers, who argues that while Aristotle rejected the 
Democritean conception of atoms, he accepted a weaker version of atomism.
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objects fi gured in this scheme as local distributions of diff erent pneuma, that is, of 
fi re and air in varying proportions. It is these varying proportions that made for 
qualitative diversity (Sambursky, 1959:18). Th e important point to register for our 
purposes is that local objects are just proper parts of the one unifi ed continuum. 
But we have just seen that proper parts do not have an essence distinct from the 
whole of which they are part. Th is means that local objects, the medium-sized dry 
goods of everyday experience, do not qualify as genuine objects. While van Inwa-
gen could agree with this, he does acknowledge the genuine ontological status of 
fundamental particles and organisms (See Van Inwagen, 1990). But it seems now 
that the Stoics couldn’t acknowledge even these. In fact, it seems now that the only 
genuine object that there could be for them is the physical world as a whole. Th is 
in eff ect leads the Stoics to a radical monism, where the only thing that is capable 
of change is the physical universe, considered as a single entity.
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